This article is written by Ms. Anjali Singh Bagri, a Third-year student of NMIMS, Indore.
ABSTRACT
Biological weapons spread toxins or disease-causing organisms with the intent to damage or destroy people, animals, or plants. They can be extremely contagious and lethal. Diseases brought on by such weapons might travel quickly worldwide and would not respect national boundaries. Intentional releases of poisons or biological agents by non-state or state actors may have disastrous results. Such events could result in widespread disease, fear and mistrust among the population, food shortages, environmental catastrophes, and terrible economic loss in addition to the tragic loss of life. Biological weapons are prohibited by the legally binding Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC opened for signing on April 10, 1972, and came into force on March 26, 1975, following discussions and negotiations in the UN disarmament conference that began in 1969. There are now four signatories (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, Syria, and Tanzania) and 183 state parties, including Palestine. Ten states (Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Namibia, South Sudan, and Tuvalu) have not ratified or signed the BWC. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was established in 1972 as a result of the international community’s ongoing concern over the potential of biological warfare. This study looks at how well the BWC is now being followed and explores the difficulties it has in the modern biotechnology environment. Among the main issues raised are the dual-use character of biological research, biotechnology breakthroughs, and the lack of a reliable verification system. The essay also looks at ways to improve international efforts to stop the spread of biological weapons and fortify the BWC.
INTRODUCTION
Global security is seriously threatened by biological warfare, which could have catastrophic effects on ecosystems, agriculture, and human health. Established in 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention is a fundamental component of global endeavours aimed at reducing the advancement and application of biological weapons. Biological weapons spread toxins or disease-causing organisms with the intent to damage or destroy people, animals, or plants. They can be extremely contagious and lethal. Diseases brought on by such weapons might travel quickly worldwide and would not respect national boundaries. Intentional releases of poisons or biological agents by non-state or state actors may have disastrous results. Such events could result in widespread disease, fear and mistrust among the population, food shortages, environmental catastrophes, and terrible economic loss in addition to the tragic loss of life. Biological weapons are prohibited by the legally binding Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC opened for signing on April 10, 1972, and came into force on March 26, 1975, following discussions and negotiations in the UN disarmament conference that began in 1969. There are now four signatories (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, Syria, and Tanzania) and 183 state parties, including Palestine. Ten states (Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Namibia, South Sudan, and Tuvalu) have not ratified or signed the BWC.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Established in 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention is a crucial international agreement designed to stop the creation, manufacturing, and procurement of biological weapons. In spite of its admirable goals, maintaining adherence to the BWC presents considerable difficulties due to changing biotechnology environments and the lack of a reliable verification system.
Lack of a thorough and legally-binding verification process is one of the main barriers to effective BWC compliance. In contrast to several other arms control agreements, the BWC does not have a global body entrusted with the explicit responsibility of overseeing and implementing adherence. The verifiability of governments’ assertions regarding their adherence to the convention is called into question by this disparity. The international community finds it challenging to determine if countries are truly dedicated to using biological research for peaceful purposes or if there are clandestine actions that violate the BWC.
New scientific opportunities and problems have arisen as a result of biotechnology advancements. Differentiating between benign and malicious biological research operations is made more difficult by the dual-use character of many of these activities. Even while the life sciences have made significant contributions to agriculture, medical treatment, and environmental preservation, it is possible that these technology and knowledge could be abused to create biological weapons. The complexity of distinguishing between activities that violate the BWC and genuine research increases with the advancement of scientific skills.
CHALLENGES FACING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Perhaps the most notable difficulty confronting the BWC is the rapid and continual expansion of biotechnological capabilities. The potential for modifying living things has increased with the development of novel technologies such as synthetic biology, gene editing, and others. Although these developments have great potential for improving health, farming, and environmental sustainability, they also give rise to worries about the possible creation of highly lethal and sophisticated biological weapons. Because these technologies have two uses, it is difficult to distinguish between legitimate research and activities that are against the BWC.
Widespread adherence is necessary for any international convention to succeed, and the BWC is no different. The convention’s worldwide influence has been undermined by the notable non-ratification or non-accession of several powerful military nations. The collective ability to successfully prevent the proliferation of biological weapons is weakened in the absence of universal adherence. Increased efforts are needed to persuade more states—particularly those with significant scientific and technological capacities—to join the BWC and pledge to uphold its goals.
Widespread adherence is necessary for any international convention to succeed, and the BWC is no different. The convention’s worldwide influence has been undermined by the notable non-ratification or non-accession of several powerful military nations. The collective ability to successfully prevent the proliferation of biological weapons is weakened in the absence of universal adherence. Increased efforts are needed to persuade more states—particularly those with significant scientific and technological capacities—to join the BWC and pledge to uphold its goals.
DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
Research on scientific and technical developments with both advantageous and perhaps hazardous applications is referred to as dual-use research. This duality presents a major obstacle for biological research because inventions meant for peaceful uses may unintentionally aid in the creation of biological weapons. Through the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), negotiating the complexity of dual-use research and technology requires striking the correct balance between addressing security concerns and supporting scientific innovation.
Research in the biotechnological and life sciences frequently yields findings with wide-ranging applicability. For example, developments in microbiology, synthetic biology, and gene editing could completely transform environmental conservation, agriculture, and medicine. These same discoveries, meantime, may be abused for evil intent, which raises questions about the unexpected effects of ostensibly harmless research endeavours.
Research in the biotechnological and life sciences frequently yields findings with wide-ranging applicability. For example, developments in microbiology, synthetic biology, and gene editing could completely transform environmental conservation, agriculture, and medicine. These same discoveries, meantime, may be abused for evil intent, which raises questions about the unexpected effects of ostensibly harmless research endeavours.
The Biological Weapons Convention stresses the importance of responsible behaviour while acknowledging the dual-use character of many biological research endeavours. Nevertheless, there are no explicit clauses in the agreement that deal with dual-use issues. This gap needs to be addressed because it presents a challenge to the international community in terms of developing policies and procedures for identifying, tracking, and regulating research activities that may have unanticipated security repercussions.
International cooperation is necessary to successfully solve the issues raised by dual-use research. Governments, the scientific community, and pertinent international organisations must collaborate to create rules that encourage ethical behaviour. Promoting open communication and transparency in research endeavours can aid in the creation of best practices that strike a balance between the demands of global security and scientific advancement.
Increasing public awareness and educating scientists, decision-makers, and the general public about the possible risks is a crucial part of managing dual-use research. Stakeholders can support a proactive strategy in preventing the misuse of scientific knowledge by encouraging a culture of accountability and ethical awareness within the scientific community.
STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
In order to meet new challenges and strengthen the Convention’s position as a barrier against the use of biological weapons, it is essential to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). A number of important steps can be taken to strengthen the BWC’s efficacy in the modern day. To strengthen the credibility of the BWC, a robust and legally enforceable verification process must be introduced. This can entail setting up a global body tasked with keeping an eye on and enforcing compliance. A well-thought-out verification system would increase openness and foster trust amongst member states, decreasing the possibility of clandestine actions that go against the convention.
It is crucial to address the ambiguity in the BWC’s definitions. To remove any room for interpretation, phrases like “biological weapons” and “biological agents” need to be defined precisely and clearly. The convention’s terminology is updated on a regular basis to reflect advances in science and technology, ensuring that it stays applicable and flexible in response to the changing biological threat environment. For the BWC to be successful, international cooperation must be strengthened. Member states ought to work together to exchange knowledge, skills, and best practices. Creating forums for communication between scientists, decision-makers, and officials of participating nations helps promote a climate of shared accountability, trust, and collaboration.
For member states to guarantee adherence to the BWC, the creation and execution of strong national laws and enforcement systems must be given first priority. This covers laws governing dual-use technologies and research, as well as sanctions for infractions. The convention is more successful overall when national implementation is strengthened. It is imperative to engage in collaboration with the scientific and research sectors. The BWC ought to collaborate actively with scientists in order to create standards and moral frameworks that encourage ethical behaviour in research endeavours. A culture of responsibility can be fostered by highlighting the dual-use nature of some research and the significance of taking ethical considerations into account.
CONCLUSION
To effectively address the obstacles presented by developing biotechnology and the dual-use nature of research, significant improvements to the Biological Weapons Convention are necessary. Implementing a strong verification mechanism, revising definitions, bolstering national implementation, enhancing international cooperation, and emphasising responsible research conduct are all necessary to strengthen the convention’s efficacy. The international community may strengthen the convention against the abuse of biological weapons and keep its commitment to global security by addressing these aspects. The Biological Weapons Convention needs to be updated to address modern issues in a world where scientific discoveries are becoming more and more important in order to guarantee a safer and healthier future for everybody.
REFERENCES
- https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwc#:~:text=The%20BWC%20does%20not%20ban,does%20not%20ban%20biodefense%20programs.&text=The%20treaty%20regime%20mandates%20that,multilaterally%2C%20to%20solve%20compliance%20concerns.
- https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/
- https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/convention-prohibition-development-production-and-stockpiling-bacteriological-biological-and-toxin-weapons-btwc/
- https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-convention-bwc/
- https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/S0020860400084679a.pdf