This Article has been written by Ms. Karishma Singh , a 2nd year B.A LL.B student from Lloyd Law College
Case Title :
Case Details :
This appeal is from a judgment and order of the High Court of Justice, Lahore, of 24 October 1941 (Criminal Amendment Side);. The question was raised, and their Lords thought it was correctly stated, in the case brought by the respondent, whether the High Court had authority under Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code to cancel all proceedings conducted under the first two information or not. report.
- The plaintiff in each case is an S.M. Some Saleh: the first report was issued on August 31, 1941 and the latest on September 5 of the same year.
- The first offense declared as a violation of Section 420 of the I.P.C. The facts are stated loosely and carelessly and downplayed to a few precise details. Accordingly, it is most doubtful that an offense should not be described as a violation of Article 417 rather than Article 420: the fundamental difference between the two is that, while ‘violation of the latter is an act’ perceivable crime’. , it was not known before and an investigation can only be carried out by the police on the direction of the judge, while in other cases the police can act on their own under Articles 154 and 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Facts :
It appears that Mr. Saleh Section was the son of Sheikh Rahmatullah who died in 1924 and some time after his death, his children, including Mr. Saleh Section, arose a dispute about distribution of his property. In this dispute, arbitrators were initially appointed, but their authority to act was subsequently withdrawn. One of the assets was a business run by the father and after his death the business was continued by his wife and children as a sole partnership according to the document. respective shares in the estate bequeathed by the deceased man, and in 1937, Saleh sued his siblings for the division of the family estate and the dissolution of the company and the rendering of accounts. Defendant is a Special Official Recipient of the High Court of Lahore and was, therefore, appointed on 17 August 1937, Recipient in this matter.
Criminal charges the police are investigating relate to his activities in connection with admissions and his alleged conduct in seeking his appointment. According to Saleh, he was persuaded by Respondent by various fraudulent representations to carry out the action and to request that Respondent be designated as receiver of the property. If this story is true, then there is no doubt that Saleh has dated her siblings. Later, however, Saleh became dissatisfied with the respondent’s activities as a receiver and on June 27, 1939, requested his removal from the role of receiver and advocate. supported his claim with an affidavit on June 9. The grounds for the claim were essentially the same as those given in the two information reports as an offense seeking prosecution. element.
The junior judge refused to accept the request, but the recipient voluntarily resigned, and Saleh and one of his brothers, Section A. Mannan, were appointed to his position. However, to clarify the situation, soon after, the lower judge, that is, on August 30, 1939, ordered the defendant to continue to own some of the property, the subject of the case, although despite the fact that he stopped possessing. is a receiver. Of these two orders, Saleh appealed to the Supreme Court, which on April 4, 1940 rejected the appeal with the court fees, remarking: “It seems that the charges are baseless. and there is no loss resulting from the conduct of Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, which is evident in the record, was made recklessly and without any attempt to check the history of the case, the examination is appropriate would prevent any reasonable person from using terms such as fraud and dishonesty. It is completely inappropriate to make such accusations without any justification.
The next step seems to have been taken by a K.L. Some Gauba, a lawyer who represented Saleh in a number of legal proceedings. This gentleman, on August 7, 1941, filed a complaint with a district judge accusing the defendant of a number of crimes, and among others, referring to Saleh’s accusations and attaching accompanied by his client’s affidavit dated June 9, 1939, supporting the petition to remove the respondent from his admission.
The district judge ordered an investigation of the charges and upon that order, the defendant’s file was seized by the police on August 27. Thereafter, Defendant requested the Supreme Court on August 28. in 1941 released them and suspended the investigation on the grounds that he was a public servant as defined by the Indian Penal Code and therefore under article 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, not being prosecuted by the court. intervention without prior government authorization.
A day later, Crown made a motion to the Judge of the Session Court, Lahore, to review the Judge’s order, requesting that the case be referred to the High Court under Section 438 of the Code with recommendation that the procedure can be continued. set aside because void ab initio has been found to have no jurisdiction, and pending a final judgment on the claim by the High Court, further proceedings may be adjourned and Sheriff of Lahore Police, was sentenced to take no further action of the investigation.
It appears that the defendant also requested the then Chief Justice who, on August 28, sent a telegram to the District Judge directing him to suspend all proceedings until further notice. report from the Chief Justice and immediately return all existing records. seized. by the police.
The district judge acted on the instructions in the telegram and gave the necessary orders for the police to follow them. Mr. Gauba then filed a request to review the District Judge’s order to continue the proceedings.
Both cases were brought before the experienced Judge of the Session, who considered himself bound by the order of the then Chief Justice and on 3 September stopped the proceedings and transferred the cases. revision to the High Court so she has it at once. like the related review is already pending there.
In the meantime, Saleh filed the two mentioned information reports and as a result the police again requested the documents they had initially seized under Mr. Gauba’s complaint and opened an investigation. about the alleged crimes.
The immediate consequence is that the respondent continues to complain, argues that the recording of the August 31 information report and its prosecution is illegal and unwarranted under the law and asks the High Court ordered the judge to order that the books be returned by the police and that the investigation could be suspended depending on the outcome of Mr. Gauba’s complaint.
A temporary pardon was granted over the holidays and a Supreme Court hearing took place on 24 October 1941.
Thereafter, two matters were considered, first, the Court’s right to hear Mr. Gauba’s petition which was contested by both the Respondent and the Crown and regarding having counterclaims required request the dismissal of the proceedings, and second, what orders, if any, should be issued to interfere with the police investigation of Saleh’s briefs.
Regarding the first part, the High Court held that the facts against which Mr. Gauba appealed related to the actions of the respondent as the official heir and, therefore, that he was an inviolable official. removed from office without the approval of the local government, and whether charged as such an official, section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code prohibits any court from adjudicating an offense guilty without prior punishment by the government has the power to order his removal from office. Accordingly, they dismissed the complaint and overturned the district judge’s order.
In this case, Mr. Gauba applied to the Court. The injunction in Section 197 is against action by any court and in these cases the Supreme Court’s decision was upheld and its order not appealed. Police action in investigating Saleh’s allegations is another matter. Where and when the court was bound to hear the case had not yet been reached, and the only question raised in this part of the case or discussed before their lords was whether the court, within violates its inherent powers under Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code to have the authority to make orders that may be necessary to prevent abuses of Court process or to ensure the purposes of justice. , in this case, it is reasonable to use its powers to cancel the police investigation.
Decision :
The High Court ruled that it had the power to drop the proceedings and block the investigation. Their motive appears to be the same charges that had been brought against Defendant four years earlier. They said that some of these allegations were subsequently positively dismissed and others were found to be unfounded in an investigation held after Respondent requested to leave his position of receiving property. me. In these and in these proceedings, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, Saleh has accused himself of being complicit in a corrupt plot to defeat the purposes of justice. The judges appear to have conducted a careful review of the previous record, concluded that Saleh’s testimony was unacceptable, and searched the police investigation file until it was finished, to see whether any information beyond what was in the previous procedure is about to happen. As a result, they found nothing.
All of this could be a good reason to dismiss Saleh’s allegation and drop any prosecution of his charge if such prosecution eventually takes place and if The court was then satisfied that no crime had been identified. But this stage was not reached. It is understood that the findings of the civil proceeding are not binding on any subsequent action based on the same or similar allegations. In addition, the police investigation has been interrupted and it is impossible to say with certainty that no further information has been obtained. But even if that is not the case, it is the duty of the criminal court to prosecute a crime before it even takes place; his own point of view and do not come to his conclusion by reference to a previous decision that does not bind him.
From the Lord’s point of view, however, the most serious aspect of the case was the Court’s interference in police duties. Just as it is essential that anyone accused of a crime have the freedom to approach a court to be acquitted if found not guilty of the crime for which he is charged, it is of the utmost importance that judges Judges should not interfere with police on matters within their jurisdiction and on matters for which they are legally obligated to investigate.
Observation
It has been observed that an FIR provides initial information about the alleged offense, to record the facts of the case before they are forgotten or glorified, and to make them available to the Court. evidence for the investigation of the case.
Although FIR is not considered evidence and has virtually no probative value, it can be used to corroborate the testimony of defendants, witnesses, victims, and others in relation to the offence. sin.
Additional Information
In India, as has been pointed out, the police have statutory powers to investigate the circumstances of an alleged, admitted crime without any permission from the judicial authorities, and as their Lords believed, it would be an unfortunate outcome to be able to reduce these statutory rights through the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary and not overlapping, and the combination of individual freedom with respect for public order can only be achieved by allowing each to exercise. function, subject of course always to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when required under Article 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to give guidance on the nature of habeas corpus. However, in a case like the present, the functions of the Court begin when an accusation is brought before the court and not before. Section 561A is sometimes said to have given the Court more powers that the Court did not have prior to the issuance of this section. But this is not the case. The article did not grant new powers, it merely provided that those powers already possessed by the Court would be retained and included, as their Lords thought, so as not to be seen as sole authority. possessed by the Court are powers expressly conferred by the Criminal Court Procedure Code and that no inherent powers exist after the enactment of that Act.
It is certain that if no identifiable offense is disclosed, and even more so if no offense is disclosed, the police will not have the authority to conduct an investigation, and For this reason, Judge Newsam may have made the right decision in Chidambaram Chattiar v. Shanmugham Pillai [1938] A.I.R. Foolhardy. 129. But that’s not it.
In the present case, under sections 154 and 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code a, the police have the statutory right to investigate a known offense without asking a court for a sanction and, to that extent, the case seems like Chhatrapat Singh Dugan c. Kharag Singh Lachmiram (1916) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 535 P.C., where, as the Supreme Court pointed out, their Assembly of Lords expressed the view that dismissing the claim on the grounds that it was an abuse of the Court’s powers could be actionable on the basis of treason.
Of course, in the present case, as well as in Mr. Gauba’s application, it is not possible to prosecute without the necessary punishment under Article 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code which was collected earlier, but stage such that the Court had not yet obtained a lawful right to intervene, in the opinion of the Lords. So far, it’s a matter of investigation, not prosecution.
In their view, their Lords will humbly advise His Majesty that an appeal should be allowed, that the Decree and Order of the High Court be dropped and the investigation allowed to continue.
References :
https://www.lawyerservices.in/
https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/index.html
Case : Chidambaram Chattiar v. Shanmugham Pillai [1938]
Case : Chhatrapat Singh Dugan c. Kharag Singh Lachmiram (1916) I.L.R. 44 Cal. 535 P.C.,