This article has been written by Ms. TANYA, a student of BA.LLB from GITARATTAN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS SCHOOL, ROHINI. The Author is a 3rd year Law student.

INTRODUCTION-

Murder is the unlawful and intentional killing of another human being. It is considered one of the most heinous crimes in society, and it is punished severely

 by the legal system. The act of murder can be premeditated or occur in the heat 

of the moment, but both forms are considered illegal and carry severe 

consequences. The motives for murder can vary widely, ranging from personal 

vendettas to financial gain or even ideological beliefs. The investigation and 

prosecution of murder cases requires thorough forensic analysis, expert 

testimony, and careful consideration of evidence to ensure that justice is served. 

Overall, murder is a serious and devastating crime that has significant 

repercussions for individuals and communities alike.

 

Details of the concept-

 

Murder is a complex crime with many different aspects and factors that must be taken into account when investigating and prosecuting cases. Here are some details on murder:

 

Definition: As mentioned earlier, murder is the unlawful and intentional killing of another human being. However, the definition can vary slightly depending on the jurisdiction and legal system.

 

Degrees of Murder: In some legal systems, murder is divided into degrees based on the intent and circumstances of the crime. First-degree murder is the most serious and often includes premeditation or the use of extreme violence. Second-degree murder usually involves an intent to kill, but not premeditation. Manslaughter is another category of homicide that involves the unintentional killing of another person.

 

Motives: The motives for murder can vary widely, ranging from personal revenge or jealousy to financial gain, ideological beliefs, or even mental illness. The prosecution must prove that the defendant had the necessary intent and motive to commit the crime.

 

Investigation: The investigation of a murder case typically involves gathering physical evidence, interviewing witnesses and suspects, analysing forensic evidence such as DNA and ballistics, and building a case against the suspect. Investigators must be meticulous and thorough to ensure that all evidence is properly collected and analysed.

 

Trial: The trial of a murder case can be complex and emotionally charged, often involving expert testimony from forensic scientists and medical professionals. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime, and the defence may present evidence and arguments to try to cast doubt on the prosecution’s case.

 

Punishment: The punishment for murder can vary widely depending on the jurisdiction and the circumstances of the crime. In some cases, the death penalty may be an option, while in others, the defendant may face life imprisonment without parole.

 

Overall, murder is a serious and devastating crime that requires a thorough investigation and careful consideration of evidence to ensure that justice is served.

 

Intent: Intent is a key element in proving murder. In general, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had the intent to kill, or at least had the intent to cause serious bodily harm that resulted in death. Intent can be difficult to prove, but circumstantial evidence such as the defendant’s actions before and after the crime, as well as any statements they made, can be used to establish intent.

 

Defenses: The defendant in a murder case may raise a number of defenses to try to avoid conviction. Some common defenses include self-defence, defence of others, duress, and mental incapacity. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, which means that even if there is some evidence to support a defence, the defendant can still be found guilty if the prosecution has enough evidence to meet its burden of proof.

 

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: In some legal systems, there are aggravating and mitigating factors that can influence the severity of the punishment for murder. Aggravating factors may include things like prior criminal history, the use of a deadly weapon, or the killing of a police officer. Mitigating factors may include things like the defendant’s age, lack of criminal history, or evidence of remorse.

 

Impact on Victims and Society: Murder has a profound impact on the victims’ families and communities. Survivors of murder victims often struggle with grief, trauma, and feelings of injustice. Murder can also contribute to a sense of fear and insecurity in the broader community. It is important to recognize and address the emotional and psychological toll that murder can take on individuals and society as a whole.

 

In summary, murder is a complex and serious crime that requires careful investigation, expert analysis, and a fair and thorough legal process to ensure that justice is served. It has a significant impact on victims, families, and communities and should be taken seriously by all members of society.

 

CONCLUSION

+In conclusion, murder is one of the most serious crimes that can be committed, 

involving the unlawful and intentional killing of another human being. The 

motives for murder can be varied, ranging from personal vendettas to 

ideological beliefs or financial gain. The investigation and prosecution or 

murder cases require thorough forensic analysis, expert testimony, and careful 

consideration of evidence to ensure that justice is served. The trial process can 

be complex and emotionally charged, often involving expert testimony and 

arguments from both the prosecution and defense. Ultimately, the goal is to hold

perpetrators accountable for their actions and provide justice for the victims and 

their families. It is important to recognize the devastating impact that murder 

can have on individuals and communities, and to work towards preventing such 

crimes from occurring in the first place.

 

CASE LAWS

Bachan Singh Etc. Etc vs State of Punjab Etc. Etc on 16 August, 1982

Equivalent citations: 1982 AIR 1325, 1983 SCR (1) 145

Author: P Bhagwati

Bench: Chandrachud, Y.V. ((Cj), Bhagwati, P.N., Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh, Gupta, A.C., Untwalia, N.L.

           PETITIONER:

BACHAN SINGH ETC. ETC.

 

Vs.

 

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF PUNJAB ETC. ETC.

 

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/08/1982

 

BENCH:

BHAGWATI, P.N.

BENCH:

BHAGWATI, P.N.

CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)

SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

GUPTA, A.C.

UNTWALIA, N.L.

 

CITATION:

 1982 AIR 1325 1983 SCR (1) 145

 1982 SCC (3) 24 1982 SCALE (1)713

 CITATOR INFO:

 E     1983 SC1155 (3,4,5,6,8,9,12,13,23,27,28,29

 RF     1989 SC 653 (17)

 E&D     1989 SC1335 (10)

 R     1989 SC2299 (2,3)

 RF     1991 SC 345 (6,11)

 

ACT:

     (A) Death Penalty, whether constitutionally valid? –

Right to live, whether the provisions of section 302, PENAL CODE, offends, 

ARTICLE 19 of the Constitution-Distinction

between “Public order” and “Law and Order”-Whether section

302, Penal Code, violates Article 21, the basic structure of

the Constitution and  Article 6(1)  of  the  International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as adopted by the

General Assembly of the United Nations and reiterated in the

Stockholm Declaration.

     (B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 354(3)-If

section 302,  Penal Code,  is  constitutional, whether the

sentencing procedure provided in section 354(3) of the Code

of Criminal   Procedure, 1973 (Act II   of  1974)   is

unconstitutional on the ground that it invests with unguided

and untrammelled discretion and allows death sentence to be

arbitrarily or freakishly imposed on a person found guilty

of murder or any other capital offence punishable under the

Indian Penal  Code with death or,  in the  alternative with

imprisonment for life.

     (C) Powers of the Supreme Court to lay down standards

or norms restricting the area of imposition of death penalty

to a narrow category of murders.

 

HEADNOTE:

     Upholding the constitutionality of  section 302, Penal

Code, and  section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Code. the Court.

^

     HELD: Per majority.

     Sarkaria, J.  [On behalf of Chandrachur, C.J., A.C.

Gupta, N.L. Untwalia, JJ. and on his own behalf].

     The right to life is not one of the rights mentioned in

Article 19 (1) of the Constitution and the six fundamentals

freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute

rights. The condition precedent for the applicability of

Article 19  is that the activity which the impugned law

prohibits and penalises, must be within the purview of and

protection of Article 19 (1). [173 E, 174 A, B-C]

146

     State of Bombay v.  R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala,  [1957] SCR

874 @ 920;  Fatechand Himmat Lal  and Ors.  v.  State  of

Maharashtra, [1977] 2 SCR  828 @ 840; A.K.  Gopalan v. The

State of Madras, [1950] 1 SCR 88, followed.

2. The Indian Penal Code, particularly those of its

provisions which cannot be justified on the ground of

unreasonableness with reference to any of the specified

heads, such as “public order” in clauses (2), (3) and (4) is

not a law imposing restrictions on any  of the  rights

conferred by  Article 19 (1). There are several offences

under the  Penal Code, such as,  theft, cheating,  ordinary

assault, which do not violate or affect “public order”, but

only “law and order”. These offences injure only specific

individuals as distinguished from the public at large. It is

now settled that “public order” means “even tempo of the

life of the community”.  That being so, even all murders do

not disturb or affect “public order”. Some murders may be of

purely private significance and the injury or harm resulting

therefrom   affects    only   specific individuals, and,

consequently, such murders may not be covered by  “public

order” within the contemplation of clauses (2), (3) and (4)

of Article 19. Such murders do not lead to public disorder

but to disorder simpliciter. Yet, no rational being can say

that punishment of such murderers is not in the general

public interest.  It may be noted that general public

interest is not specified as a head in clauses (2) to (4) on

which restriction on the rights mentioned in clause (i) of

the Article may be justified.

[181 D-H, 182 A-B]

     The real distinction between the areas of “law and

order” and “public order” lies not merely in the nature or

quality of the act, but in the degree and extent. Violent

crimes similar in nature, but committed in different

contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions.

A murder committed in given circumstances may cause only a

slight tremor, the wave length of which does not extend

beyond the parameters of law and order.  Another murder

committed in different context and circumstances may unleash

a tidal wave of such intensity, gravity and magnitude, that

its impact throws out of gear the even flow of life.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that for such murders which do

not affect “public order”, even the provision for life

imprisonment in section 302, Indian Penal Code,  as  an

alternative punishment, would not be justifiable under

clauses (2), (3) and (4) as a reasonable restriction in the

interest of “public order”. Such a construction must,

therefore, be avoided. Thus construed, Article  19 will be

attracted only to such laws, the provisions of which are

capable of being tested under clauses (2) to (5) of Article

19. [182 B-E]

     R.S. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530; Maneka

Gandhi v.  Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Dr. Ram Manohar

Lohia’s case, [1966]1 SCR  709; Hardhan Saha and Anr.  v.

State of West Bengal, [1975] 1 SCR 778@ 784, followed.

3. From the decided cases of the Supreme Court, it is

clear that the test of direct and indirect effect was not

scrapped. Indeed, there is no dispute that the test of “pith

and substance” of the subject-matter and of direct and of

incidental effect of legislation is a very useful test to

determine the question of legislative competence, i.e., in

ascertaining whether an Act falls under one Entry

147

while incidentally encroaching upon another Entry. Even for

determining the validity of a legislation on the ground of

infringement of fundamental rights, the subject matter and

the object of the legislation is not altogether irrelevant.

For instance, if the subject matter of the legislation

directly covers any of the fundamental freedoms mentioned in

Article 19 (1). It must pass the test of reasonable ness

under the relevant head in clauses (2) to (6) of that

Article. If the legislation does not directly deal with any

of the rights in  Article 19 (1), that may not conclude the

enquiry. It will have to be ascertained further whether by

its direct and immediate operation, the impugned legislation

abridges any of the rights enumerated in Article 19 (1).

[189 B-D]

     The mere fact that the impugned law incidentally,

remotely or collaterally has the effect of abridging or

abrogating those rights, will not satisfy the test. If the

answer to the above queries be in the affirmative, the

impugned law in order to be valid must pass the test of

reasonableness under  Article 19.  But if the impact of the

law on any of the rights under clause (1) of Article 19 is

merely incidental, indirect, remote or collateral and is

dependent upon factors which may or may not come into play,

the anvil of Article 19 will not be available for judging

its validity. [190 A-C]

     R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530; Maneka

Gandhi v.  Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR  621; Subrahmanyam

Chatter’s case, [1940] FCR  188; Ram Singh v.  State of

Delhi, [1951] SCR 451; Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. and Anr

1. The Union of India & Ors., [1959] SCR 12; Minnesota Ex.

Rel. Olson, [1930] 283 U.S. 697 @ 698; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.

and Ors.  v. The Union of India, [1962] 3 SCR 842; Naresh

Shridhar Mirajkar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.,

[1966] 3 SCR 744; Bennett Coleman’s case, AIR 1973 SC 106,

referred to.

4. Section 299 defines “culpable homicide” and section

300 defines culpable homicide amounting to murder. Section

302 prescribes death or imprisonment for life as penalty for

murder. It cannot, reasonably or rationally, be contended

that any of the rights mentioned in Article 19 (1) of the

Constitution confers the freedom to commit murder or, for

the matter of that, the freedom to commit any offence

whatsoever. Therefore, penal laws, that is to say laws which

define offences and prescribe punishment for the commission

of offences do not attract the application of  Article 19

(1). It cannot be said that the object of the penal laws is

generally, such as not to involve any violation of the rights

conferred by  Article 19 (1) because after the decision of

this Court in the Bank Nationalisation case the theory, that

the object and form of the State action alone determine the

extent of protection that may be claimed by an individual

and that the effect of the State action on the fundamental

right of the individual is irrelevant, stands discredited.

But the point of the matter is that, in pith and substance,

penal laws do not deal with the subject-matter of rights

enshrined in  Article 19 (1). That again is not enough for

the purpose of deciding upon the applicability of Article

19, because even if a law does not, in its pith and

substance, deal with any of the fundamental rights conferred

by Article 19 (1), if the direct and inevitable effect of

the law is such as to abridge or abrogate any of those

rights, Article19 (1) shall have to be attracted. It would

then become necessary to test the

148

validity of even a penal law on the touchstone of that

Article. On this latter aspect of the matter, it is clear

that the deprivation of freedom consequent upon an order of

conviction and sentence are not a direct and inevitable

consequence of the penal law but is merely incidental to the

order of conviction and sentence which may or may not come

into play, that is to say, which may or may not be passed.

Section 302  of the Penal Code, therefore, does not have to

stand the test of  Article 19 (1) of the Constitution. [190

C-H, 191 A-B]

     The onus of satisfying the requirements of Article 19,

assuming that the Article applies.  lies on the person

challenging its validity. There is initial presumption in

favour of the constitutionality of the state and the burden

of rebutting that presumption is thrown on the party who

challenges the constitutionality on the ground of Article

19. Behind   the view that there is a presumption of

constitutionality of a statute and the onus to rebut the

same lies on those who challenge the legislation, is the

rationale of judicial restraint, a recognition of the limits

of judicial   review, a respect for the boundaries of

legislative and   judicial functions, and the judicial

responsibility to guard the trespass from one side or the

other. The primary function of the courts is to interpret

and apply  the laws  according to the will of those who made

them and  not to  transgress into  the legislative domain of

policy-making. Even where the burden is on the State to show

that the restriction imposed by the impugned statute is

reasonable and in public interest, the extent and the manner

of discharge of the burden necessarily depends on the

subject-matter of   the legislation, the nature of the

inquiry, and the scope and limits of judicial review.

      [192 C-D, 193 A, C-D, 194 D-E]

     Saghir Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1955] 1 SCR

707; Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam & Ors., A.I.R. 1964

SC 925; B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, [1975] 2 SCR 774 @ 787;

Pathumma v.  State of Kerala, [1978] 2 SCR  537; Dennis v.

United States, 341 US 494, 525:  95 L.Ed.  1137: 71 S. Ct.

857; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153: 49 L.Ed. 2nd 859; State

of Madras v. V.G. Rao, [1952] SCR 597 @ 607; Jagmohan Singh

1. State of U. P., [1973] 2 SCR 541, referred to.
2. Statistical attempts to assess the true penological

value of capital punishment remains inconclusive.  Firstly,

statistics of deterred potential murderers are hard to

obtain. Secondly, the approach adopted by the Abolitionists

is over simplified at the cost of other relevant but

imponderable factors, the appreciation of which is essential

to assess the true penological value of capital punishment.

The number of such factors is infinitude, their character

variable, duration   transient and   abstract formulation

difficult. Conditions change from country to country and

time to time. Due to the inconsistency of social conditions,

it is not scientifically possible to assess with any degree

of accuracy, as to whether the variation in the incidence of

capital crime is attributable to the presence or absence of

death penalty in the penal law of that country for such

crimes.

    [215 E-H, 216 A]

149

6. To sum up, the question whether or not death penalty

serves any penological purpose is a difficult, complex and

intractable issue.  It has evoked strong, divergent views.

For the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the

impugned provision as to death penalty in section 302, Penal

Code, on the ground of reasonableness in the light of

Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, it is not necessary

to express any categorical opinion, one way or the other, as

to which of these two antithetical views, held by the

Abolitionists and   Retentionists, is correct. It is

sufficient to say that the very fact that persons of reason,

learning and light are rationally and deeply divided in

their opinion on this issue, is a ground among others, for

rejecting the petitioners’ argument that retention of death

penalty in the impugned provision, is totally devoid of

reason and purpose. If, notwithstanding the view of the

Abolitionists to the contrary, a very large segment of

people the world over, including sociologists, legislators,

jurists, judges and administrators still firmly believe in

the worth and necessity of capital punishment for the

protection of society, if in the perspective of prevailing

crime conditions in India, contemporary public opinion

chanalised   through   the   people’s representatives in

Parliament, has repeatedly in the last three decades,

rejected all attempts, including the one made recently, to

abolish or specifically restrict the area of death penalty,

if death penalty is still a recognised legal sanction for

murder or some types of murder in most of the civilised

countries in the world, if the framers of the Indian

Constitution was fully aware of the existence of death

penalty as punishment for murder, under  the Indian Penal

Code, if the 35th Report and subsequent Reports of the Law

Commission suggesting retention of death penalty, and

recommending revision of the Criminal Procedure Code and the

insertion of the new  sections 235  (2) and 354 (3) in that

Code providing for pre-sentence hearing and sentencing

procedure on conviction for murder another capital offences

were before the Parliament and presumably considered by it

when in 1972-73 it took up revision of the Code of 1898, and

replaced it by the  Code of  Criminal Procedure,  1973,  it

cannot be said that the provision of death penalty as an

alternative punishment for murder, in section 302,  Penal

Code, is unreasonable and not in public interest. Therefore,

the impugned provision in section 302, violates neither the

letter nor the ethos of Article 19. [221 B-H, 222 A]

7. (i) Neither the new interpretative dimensions given

to Articles 19 and 21 by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi,

[1978] 2 SCR 621, and Charles Sobraj v. The Superintendent,

Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi, [1979] 1 SCR 512, nor the

acceptance by India of the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights, makes any change in the prevailing

standards of decency and human dignity.  The International

Covenant does not outlaw capital punishment for murder

altogether. [225 C-E]

     (ii) In accordance with the interpretative principle

indicated by the Supreme Court in Maneka’s case, Article 21

will read as “No person shall be deprived of his life or

personal liberty   except according to fair, just and

reasonable procedure established by valid law” or in its

converse positive form as “A person may be deprived of his

life or personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and

reasonable procedure established by valid law.” Article 21,

thus, clearly

150

brings out the implication, that the Founding Fathers

recognised the right of the State to deprive a person of his

life or personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and

reasonable procedure established by valid law.  In view of

the constitutional provisions-Entries 1 and 2 in List III

Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule Articles 72 (1) (c), 161

and 134-it cannot be said that death penalty under section

302, Penal Code, per se or because of its execution by

hanging, constitutes an unreasonable, cruel or unusual

punishment. By reason of the same constitutional postulates,

it cannot be said that the framers of the Constitution

considered death sentence for murder or the prescribed

traditional mode of its execution as a degrading punishment

which would defile “the dignity of the individual” within

the contemplation of the Preamble to the Constitution. On

parity of reasoning, it cannot be said that death penalty

for the offence of murder violates the basic structure of

the Constitution. [222 E-H, 223 A-B, F-H]

     (iii)  Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 6  of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights do not

abolish or prohibit the imposition of death penalty in all

circumstances. All that they require is that, firstly, death

penalty shall not be arbitrarily inflicted; secondly, it

shall be imposed only for most serious crimes in accordance

with a law which shall not be an ex post facto legislation.

Thus, the requirements of these clauses are substantially

the same as the guarantees or prohibitions contained in

Articles 20 and 21 of our Constitution. India’s commitment,

therefore, does not go beyond what is provided  in the

Constitution and  the Indian Penal Code  and  the  Criminal

Procedure Code. The Penal Code prescribes death penalty as

an alternative punishment only for heinous crimes which are

not more  than seven  in number.  Section 354 (3)  of the

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in keeping with the spirit of

the International Covenant, has further restricted the area

of death penalty. India’s penal laws, including the impugned

provisions and their application, are thus entirely in

accord with its international commitment. [224 G-H, 225 A-C]

8. The procedure provided in Criminal Procedure Code

for imposing capital punishment for murder and some other

capital crimes under the   Penal Code  cannot, by any

reckoning, be said to be unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Nor

can it be said that this sentencing discretion, with which

the Courts are invested, amounts to delegation of its power

of legislation by Parliament. The impugned provisions do not

violate Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

      [238 B, G-H, 239 A-B]

     Section 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes

not only   explicit what according to the decision in

Jagmohan’s case was implicit in the scheme of the Code, but

also bifurcates the trial by providing two hearings, one at

the preconvention stage and another at the pre-sentence

stage. And,  section 354 (3) of the Code marks a significant

shift in the legislative policy underlying the Code, 1898,

as in force immediately before April 1, 1974, according to

which both  the alternative sentences  of  death  or

imprisonment for life provided for murder and for certain

other capital offences under  the Penal Code, were normal

sentences. Now, according to this changed legislative policy

which is patent on the face of section 354 (3), the normal

punishment for murder and  six other capital offences under

the Penal Code is imprisonment for life (or imprisonment for

a term of years) and death penalty is an exception. [229 F-

G, A-B]

151

     Although sub-section (2) of  section 235 of the Code

does not contain a specific provision as to evidence and

provides only for hearing of the accused as to sentence, yet

it is implicit in this provision that if a request is made

in that behalf by either the prosecution or the accused, or

by both, the Judge should give the party or  parties

concerned an opportunity of producing evidence or material

relating to the various factors bearing on the question of

sentence. [230 E-F]

     Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., [1973] 2 SCR 541,

reiterated.

     Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR  1973 SC  2385,

referred to.

9. The expression “special reasons” in the context of

section 354  (3) obviously means “exceptional reasons”

founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the

particular case relating to crime as well as criminal. Thus,

the legislative policy now writ large and clear on the face

of section 354 (3) is that on conviction of murder and other

capital offences punishable in the alternative with death

under the Penal Code, the extreme penalty should be imposed

only in extreme cases. [236 C-D]

     Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, [1976] 2 SCR 684,

referred to.

10. Section 235(2)  of the Code  provides  for a

bifurcated trial and specifically gives the accused person a

right of pre-sentence hearing, at which stage, he can bring

on record material or evidence, which may not be strictly

relevant to or connected with the particular crime under

inquiry, but nevertheless have, consistently with the policy

underlined in  section 354  (3), a bearing on the choice of

sentence. The  present legislative  policy discernible from

section 235(2) read with  section 354(3)  is that in fixing

the degree of punishment or making the choice of sentence

for various offences, including one under section 302, Penal

Code,  the   Court should not confine its consideration

“principally” or “merely” to the circumstances connected

with the particular crime, but also give due consideration

to the circumstances of the criminal. [237 C-E]

11. The Supreme Court should not venture to formulate

rigid standards in an area in which the Legislature so

warily treads. Only broad guidelines consistent with the

policy indicated by the Legislature can be laid down. But

this much can be said that in order to qualify for inclusion

in the category of “aggravating circumstances” which may

form the basis of “special reasons” in  section 354(3),

circumstances found on the facts of a particular case, must

evidence aggravation of an abnormal or special degree. [243

E-F, 254 B-C]

     Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors. v.  State of  Punjab,

[1980] 3 SCR p. 383, applied.

     Hyman and Anr. v. Rose, [1912] AC 623, referred to.

12. Sections 354 (3) and 235 (2) and other related

provisions of the Code of 1973 make it clear that for making

the choice of punishment or for ascertaining

152

the existence or absence of “special reasons” in that

context, the Court must pay due regard both to the crime and

the criminal. What is the relative weight to be given to the

aggravating and mitigating factors, depends on the facts and

circumstances of the particular case. More often than not,

these two aspects are so intertwined that it is difficult to

give a separate treatment to each of them. This is so

because “style is the man.” In many cases, the extremely

cruel or beastly manner of the commission of murder is

itself a demonstrated index of the depraved character of the

perpetrator. That is why, it is not desirable to consider

the circumstances of the crime and the circumstances of the

criminal in two separate water-tight compartments.  In a

sense, to kill is to be cruel and therefore all murders are

cruel. But   such cruelty   may vary in its degree of

culpability. And it is only when the culpability assumes the

proportion of extreme depravity that “special reasons” can

legitimately be said to exist.

 

REFERENCES

• https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=dowry%20death

• https://blog.ipleaders.in/dowry-death-understanding-basics/?amp=1

• INDIAN PENAL CODE

Aishwarya Says:

The copyright of this Article belongs exclusively to Ms. Aishwarya Sandeep. Reproduction of the same, without permission will amount to Copyright Infringement. Appropriate Legal Action under the Indian Laws will be taken.

If you would also like to contribute to my website, then do share your articles or poems to secondinnings.hr@gmail.com

Join our  Whatsapp Group for latest Job Opening